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Steinbock, B. (ed.): 2007, The Oxford Handbook of
Bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press. 747 pages.
ISBN 978-0-19-927335-5. Price: £ 85.
The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics aims ‘‘to provide an up-
to-date picture of the state of the art in bioethics’’. If the goal
has been achieved, bioethics is a scholarly, predominantly
philosophical and Anglo-American discipline that covers
the ethical issues in our efforts—broadly construed—to
improve human health on both the individual and the pop-
ulation level. Some readers will certainly disagree with this
particular perspective on the field. They might argue that
empirical, activist or international perspectives on bioethics
are underrepresented in this handbook, or that bioethics
spans issues far beyond the scope of those covered here.
Given the wide spectrum of opinion about what bioethics is,
and what it is not, it seems clear that no handbook of the
field will satisfy all of its audience. There should be wide-
spread agreement, however, that the Oxford Handbook of
Bioethics is an impressive and stimulating collection of
original essays on some of the deepest and most challenging
ethical issues in how we maintain, restore and enhance
human health.
Bonnie Steinbock, the Handbook’s editor, has assembled
30 contributions penned by both emerging and established
bioethicists. The book is organized into eight parts, covering
theoretical and methodological issues in bioethics, issues
related to justice and policy, bodies and bodily parts, the end
of life, reproduction and cloning, genetics and enhancement,
research ethics, and public and global health. All essays are
between 20–30 pages in length and provide their authors’
particular take on a given topic. This can make familiarity
with complex arguments and prior knowledge of the subject
at hand a clear advantage. The Oxford Handbook is in fact
less of a handbook and more of an edited volume on a broad
range of bioethical issues.
Indeed, the status between handbook and edited volume is
my primary complaint about the Handbook. The Handbook
misses the unifying question of an edited volume, and hence
the progress to an answer. But, the Handbook is also too
detailed and charged with particular views to serve as a
concise and ready reference or first orientation on respective
topics. Most contributions aim to provide an overview of a
subject and defend a view, but few succeed in doing both.
This is why I was happiest when the authors decided to do
only one of these things. Gerald Dworkin’s essay on physi-
cian-assisted death, for example, is a superb and very
nuanced introduction to a long-standing debate. Julian Sav-
ulescu’s and Thomas Murray’s engaging contributions on
enhancement almost stand as opposing Pro and Con pieces,
and Soren Holm’s detailed exploration of the tensions
between deliberative democracy and standard bioethics
analysis is delightful. The Oxford Handbook contains many
inspiring papers and therefore deserves a large audience.
However, those looking for a concise bioethics reference or a
coherent set of essays should turn to different sources.
Annette Rid
Bethesda, United States
Battin, M.P., Francis, L.P., and Landesman, B.M. (eds.):
2007, Death, Dying and the Ending of Life Aldershot:
Ashgate. 2 Vols. Volume I: 449 pages. Volume II: 517
pages. ISBN 978-0-7546-2174-4. Price: $475.
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Questions around the subjects of death, dying and the
ending of life remain a permanent and controversial public
and scientific concern as recurring cases in end of life
treatment show, e.g. recently the case of Eluana Englaro in
Italy. In order not to lose a level that has already been
achieved in bioethics, a collection of classical articles in
fast evolving disciplines is a highly desirable research tool.
The present volumes are part of a book series, the Inter-
national Library of Medicine, Ethics and Law edited by
Michael D. Freedman, pursuing the aim to provide such a
tool. The claim in the series preface is to make available
classical articles which may not be easily accessible due to
the publication date and to the wide range of journals
where they were published the first time.
The difficult task to present an excellent, interdisci-
plinary and balanced choice of such articles covering the
most important fields in relation to the main subjects has
been perfectly solved by the editors. In a clear and con-
vincing logical order the material is arranged in four main
parts: Death, Decision-making at the end of life, Hastening
Death and Distributive Justice and Decisions about Life
and Death. In total the two volumes contain 54 articles
reprinted in their original format covering relevant debates
from 1958 to 2003 while most of the articles have been
published between 1985 and 1995. The authors are among
the most renowned contemporary American bioethicists
(e.g. David Callahan, Allan Buchanan, Dan Brock,
Philippa Foot, and Norman Daniels). John Harris is the
only European contributor, which in the case of bioethics
might be justifiable even in an ‘‘international library’’ as
American authors have provided the basis for the interna-
tional development of the discipline, although some
classical articles from other intellectual contexts and tra-
ditions would have been desirable.
Both volumes contain instructive and well-written
introductions which finally make the anthology the most
valuable and recommendable research tool the series
introduction promises to provide. In times however where
university librarians are facing more and more budget cuts
(and most older articles are not anymore difficult to access
due to the internet), the publishing house could have either
tried to offer the book for a more affordable price or could
have offered the reader more in return as, e.g., a more
reader friendly print layout than just the partially down-
sized copies of the original journal layouts. A more
detailed index and general bibliography would as well have
added more scientific value to the book. However the
references of the articles and the very well-structured
chapters compensate this lack.
Hans-Jo¨rg Ehni
Tu¨bingen, Germany
Atighetchi, D.: 2007, Islamic Bioethics: Problems and
Perspectives. New York: Springer. 378 pages. ISBN: 978-
1402049613. Price: € 96.64.
This book gives an overview over selected (bio-)medical
issues as they are discussed in the framework of Islamic law.
It aims ‘‘to offer a first attempt at the unitary reflection on
three levels (juridical reflection, national laws and conduct
of the faithful)’’ (p. 10). After three introductory chapters
lining out the multiple dimensions of contemporary Muslim
bioethical reflection Atighetchi presents several chapters on
concrete issues such as abortion, AIDS, end of life or female
genital mutilation in eight chapters. This is concluded by a
final chapter on modern trends in Qur’anic exegesis, which
aim at proving that all modern scientific knowledge is
already incorporated into or at least in accordance with the
Qur’an. In a brief general conclusion the author points out
the inherent plurality of bioethical positions within con-
temporary Muslim discourse (p. 353).
Dariusch Atighetchi has to be thanked for having per-
formed a tremendous task by trying to integrate the many
dispersed shorter publications on selected issues of Muslim
bioethical reasoning into one big book thus creating an
important point of departure and standard work of reference
for future research in the rapidly emerging field of Islamic
Bioethics. Especially for this reason he has also to be con-
gratulated for having covered some hitherto underexplored
issues within literature on Islamic Bioethics such as AIDS or
Pre-Natal Diagnosis. Undoubtedly, his long standing
research on the topic, which was only accessible in Italian
until now, has now climaxed in this important book.
However, some critical remarks might be in order. For
example, the pluralism of Islamic Bioethics, which is
explained by ‘‘[t]he absence of a supreme juridical-religious
authority’’ (p. 9), is somewhat at odds with the concluding
chapter, that identifies two major trends of liberal and
restrictive positions within Muslim Bioethical Debates
(p. 353). Therefore the final sentence that ‘‘[t]here is not just
one Islam but there are many’’ might still cause the question
how these ‘‘many Islams’’ are to be analytically distin-
guished. Is it, for example, by sectarian affiliation (Sunni vs.
Shi’i), by legal school (e.g. Maliki vs. Hanafi) or by certain
ethical principles such as consequentialist vs. ontological
reasoning? Also, the book relies almost exclusively on
sources in Western languages while describing medical
realities and ethical discussions that take place primarily in
the Middle East. This might cause some frowns on a meth-
odological plane, because most of the processes described in
the book take place and are negotiated as well as abundantly
documented in Persian and Arabic.
Thomas Eich
Washington DC, United States
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Vollmann, J.: 2008, Patientenselbstbestimmung und Sel-
bstbestimmungsfa¨higkeit Beitra¨ge zur Klinischen Ethik.
Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 268 pages. ISBN: 978-3-17-
019842-5. Price: € 38.
A patient’s self-determination is one of the most important
values in contemporary medicine. The traditional—patri-
archal structured—doctor-patient relationship is being
gradually abandoned in favour of a shared decision-mak-
ing model and of informed consent. However, patient
autonomy often meets its limitations due to a limited or
non-existent capacity for self-determination. This is par-
ticularly the case for patients with mental or neurological
disorders like dementia as well as for children and aging
people. In such situations the discussion about an adequate
treatment of the patient’s will must be based on a theo-
retical approach and on practical clinical advice. This book
offers—for the first time in the German-speaking area—a
sound presentation of the scientific basics, including own
investigations, as well as of the practical implementation.
The first part of the book, ‘‘The Patient’s Autonomy/Will
in Medicine’’, gives an introduction to the topic from dif-
ferent complementary perspectives such as history, ethics,
legal, clinical, and health economics. The second part,
entitled ‘‘Models and Conceptions’’, presents an ethical
model to implement self-determination in the psychiatric
setting, and discusses mental capacity in a relational model.
Furthermore, it introduces the Mac Arthur Competence
Assessment Test, which is today’s standard instrument to
determine the level of capacity for self-determination. He
discusses that the test focuses on cognitive aspects and
ignores widely factors like the normative framework and
attitudes of the individual patient. The second part of the
book offers a discussion of conceptual and methodological
questions regarding the determination of the mental
capacity for self-determination among children. The third
part introduces four empirical studies on people suffering
from a mental disease, which were done during the past few
years. The fourth part covers the issue of mental compe-
tence among aging patients in relation to active euthanasia
and assistance to suicide. It ends with a review of literature
about different approaches towards medical assistance to
suicide among several international psychiatrists. An out-
look into the new and evolving area of clinical ethics—as a
special domain of the medical ethics discussion in Ger-
many—concludes the editorial part of the book.
The appendix offers the German translations of the
research and diagnostic material.
The book is of a high standard and will constitute a
useful companion for all professionals, in particular phy-
sicians and medical practitioners, who are working in this
field. The author emphasises on a differentiated, well
balanced and hands-on presentation of the topic, and he is
far away from any over-intellectualized moralisation.
Manfred Buchberger and Gabriela Stoppe
Basel, Switzerland
Markens, S.: 2007, Surrogate Motherhood and the Politics
of Reproduction. Berkeley: University of California Press.
277 pages. ISBN: 978-0520252042. Price: $18.99.
An interesting Newsweek article from last year entitled
‘‘The Curious Lives of Surrogates’’ had brought to our
attention the prevalence of wives of US soldiers choosing
to become surrogates in order to supplement their family
income. Given the rising rate of infertility, the lucrative
nature of surrogacy and progress of assisted reproductive
technology (ART), governments and legislatures across the
USA have tried to respond accordingly, however, they have
historically demonstrated a lack of adequate and consistent
policy arrangements, as discussed in the first chapter of this
book. Hence, there is no ‘‘clear sense of what rights and
responsibilities accrue to the various parties involved’’
(p. 180). Underlying the surrogacy culture is a complex
array of socio-political and ideological factors. Ethical
debates about reproductive rights, reproductive autonomy,
desirable familial/parental structures, the stigma of infer-
tility and exploitation, all take place within a climate of
commercialism and free market enterprise. However, the
book demonstrates that the surrogacy issue is indeed much
broader than a culture war of competing values and beliefs.
The core discussion begins in chapter two, which
examines what constitutes the ‘‘best interests of children’’.
Chapter 3 focuses on the discourse concerning surrogacy
policy and how it is influenced by the way political debates
about family and parenthood are framed. Chapter 4 dis-
cusses the media coverage of surrogacy ‘‘horror stories’’
and Chapter 5 contrasts the legislative responses between
New York and California. The final chapter focuses on the
importance of the feminist perspective since contentions
largely reflect a lack of consensus in regards to what is in
the best interests of women. The author discusses, from an
historical perspective, the changing ideals about mother-
hood and family, and the expectations of them in light of
the options presented by ART.
Given the exceptional relational outcomes that result
from surrogacy and ART, societies will be forced to radi-
cally revise and assimilate their concepts of mother, father,
son and daughter. Legislatures across the US are still
struggling to follow in suit, thus making it difficult to avoid
the potential mess that may arise despite the salience of
many previous experiences as discussed in the book, none
more so than the ‘‘Baby M’’ case. This book clearly
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demonstrates the complexity, broadness and intertwining
of the socio-political factors that form the landscape of the
surrogacy culture in the US. An invaluable read for those
interested in the politics and sociology of surrogacy.
Matthew M. Tieu
Adelaide, Australia
Paterson, C.: 2008, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. A
Natural Law Ethics Approach. Aldershot: Ashgate. 217
pages. ISBN: 978-0-7546-5745-3. Price: € 86.99.
In more than one respect Craig Paterson’s natural law
ethics distinctly differs from the ideas of other natural law
philosophers, classical as well as contemporary. For start-
ers, the author is deeply committed to a secular natural law
ethics. Natural ethicists often trade on (Roman Catholic)
moral theology, especially in the debate over the moral
(and legal) status of euthanasia and assisted suicide. Pat-
erson, however, is convinced that as ‘privileged sources of
information’ revelation and faith cannot support a credible
natural law approach to ethics, especially when faced with
the reality of pluralism in contemporary society. In his
view, a secularly grounded natural law ethics is indeed an
ethics based on our natural human ability to reason but also
one which abandons the idea of a supernatural ordering of
man towards God. Instead, such a natural law approach
should offer a ‘polyteleological’ notion of what constitutes
the ‘good life’ for persons. In addition, such an ethics
should provide for a solid framework for assessing the
justification for (and limitation of) coercive force by the
state over moral questions. Does Paterson offer a con-
vincing secular defense of the ‘sanctity-of-life’—principle?
Is it always and everywhere morally wrong to intentionally
kill an innocent person, regardless of further appeals to
consequences or motives?
The author starts his line of reasoning by reviewing (in
Chapter 2) the major ideas (inter alia quality-of-life, self-
determination and the rejection of double effect reasoning)
underlying the push for the moral acceptability of eutha-
nasia, assisted suicide and some forms of suicide. After
having explained his pluralistic account of primary goods,
after having identified the practical requirements for
choosing reasonably (in Chapter 3) and after having argued
(in Chapter 4) that respect for and non-violation of the
primary good of human life generates a concrete moral
absolute never to intentionally kill an innocent person,
whether as an end or as a means to an end, he returns to
those ideas (in Chapter 5) and challenges them. After
having argued (in Chapter 6) that all individualized
human beings (higher brain dead included) are persons
(who—therefore—may never be killed intentionally), he
maps out (in the final chapter) the implications of the
concrete moral absolute for suicide, assisted suicide and
euthanasia as regards the use of state power.
Although the Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia certainly
has its shortcomings—the statement that all the primary
goods constitute ultimate reasons to act should have been
followed up by a more thorough analysis of moral reasoning
[as offered for example by Robert George in In Defense of
Natural Law (1999)]—these are outweighed by the author’s
in-depth analysis of action and innocence, his convincing
defense of the use of double effect reasoning and his per-
suasive arguments for upholding the action/omission
distinction. Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia is definitely a
must for those who intuitively have difficulty accepting
arguments based on quality-of-life, personal autonomy or
self-ownership as arguments for the decriminalization of
assisted suicide and certain forms of euthanasia. Craig
Paterson articulates their unease very well.
Martin Buijsen
Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Glover, J.: 2006, Choosing Children. The Ethical Dilem-
mas of Genetic Intervention. New York: Oxford University
Press. 120 pages. ISBN 0-199-29092-X. Price: $15.95.
Glover’s book aims to answer a standard question dis-
cussed in the ethical debates on genetic intervention:
should we welcome the powers to reduce the incidence of
disabilities and disorders given to us by genetic and
reproductive technologies? Over and above Glover reflects
on the desirability and permissibility of human enhance-
ment and considers it both as potentially dangerous and as
something that may offer significant benefits to humankind.
An interesting point in his approach is that we cannot
differentiate prima facie between both aspects: his starting
definition of ‘‘disability’’ as not only socially constructed
and not only medical, too, but, according to the capabilities
approach, as a lack of capabilities that are necessary to
achieve worthy human functionings demands to consider
the advantages and dangers of particular technologies
regarding their influence on specific forms of human
flourishing. In this sense the author offers more than the
usual and simplifying dichotomy which regards these
technologies either as dangerous and as to be prevented, or
as welcome.
Glover is aware of one of the major problems of this
definition, which refers to the necessity of defining what
human flourishing is or should be, and Glover’s treatment
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of some cases shows that his account will not remain
uncontested. For example, in his opinion, the parental
choice of using technologies to choose a ‘‘deaf child’’
should be respected. It is unquestionable that a deaf person
can flourish. But to allow the intentional choice of a child
with fewer possibilities to develop some forms of human
flourishing can reasonably be put in question even by the
capabilities approach.
Glover differentiates this case from the case of delib-
erately intervening at the fetal stage and making a hearing
child deaf, which would be wrong. He discusses Parfit’s
well known Non-Identity-Thesis. According to Glover,
Parfit is right to stress the issue that some acts that do not
harm anyone can still make the world worse compared to
the effects of an alternative course of action on potential
people. But Glover criticizes Parfit’s approach as defining
the whole ethics. Instead of this, he proposes a ‘‘supple-
mentary approach’’ (p. 46) which additionally considers
(recurring to Scanlon’s Theory) what we owe to people.
In contrast to the case of choosing a deaf child, who
would be glad to exist if the alternative action of choosing
a hearing child implicates his non-existence, the use of
technology to make a potentially hearing child deaf does
not respect what we owe to him and should be criticized
(but this criticism should be extended to the case of
parents refusing cochlear implants, what Glover does not
do!). A central problem of Glover’s ‘‘supplementary
approach’’ of ethics is that it does not offer any criteria to
define how this hybrid conception of ethics works, that is,
which one of the two competing theories takes precedence
in which case. In my opinion it is not clear if this aim can
be achieved.
Glover’s book is informative, argumentative and well
structured. It discusses most of the positions in the current
debate about enhancement. The price for its shortness is
that some ideas and arguments are not deeply enough
discussed—so at the end this book remains (admittedly)
speculative.
Daniel Loewe
Tu¨bingen, Germany
Beauchamp, T. L. and Childress, J. F.: 2008, Principles of
Biomedical Ethics, 6th edn. New York: Oxford University
Press. 432 pages. ISBN 978-0195335705. Price: € 37.99.
Eight years after the fifth edition and more than 30 years
after the first edition, a new edition of Principles of Bio-
medical Ethics appeared. Like the previous editions this one
includes a lot of significant changes, although not in the
overall structure of the theory well known as principlism.
While the main change between the third and the fourth
edition probably has been on the level of methodology (in
the form of making more explicit the meta-ethical outlook
of principlism), since the fifth edition (2001) Beauchamp
and Childress have emphasized both the importance of a
virtue-ethical-approach and the foundational role of com-
mon morality as the starting point and final standard of their
theory. This trend is going on in this sixth edition also: On
the one hand they count care ethics now as a variant of
virtue ethics and have expanded their theory of common
morality (in the first and the final chapter of this new edi-
tion). Additionally Beauchamp and Childress have added a
new chapter dealing with the moral status of entities which
has become subject of many discussions in the last ten years
and has given rise to different approaches. In this chapter
one can see how principlism as a flexible, pluralistic and a
theory operating on the mid-level of justification is able to
integrate important aspects of this debate without being in
danger to become a fixed and one-sided approach.
Besides this the reader can find discussions of some new
topics which have become important in recent years (e.g.,
globalization and justice in international relations) or of
topics according to which philosophical debates have made
progress in between (e.g., paternalism) or which needed an
actualised discussion because of developments in law or
society.
Finally, it should be said that Beauchamp and Childress
throughout this edition try to show that their theory is
wrongly blamed with two criticisms: Neither can princip-
lism be accused of simply applying the four principles
(respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, jus-
tice) in a deductive manner, nor is it true that respect for
autonomy rules out the other principles in case of conflict.
So, although this sixth edition has basically the same
structure as the last one, there is a lot of improvement in
detail. This edition is surely better suitable and accessible
for beginners in the field. In some rare parts (e.g. the dis-
cussions of theories of autonomy or personhood) the
advanced reader should consult the fifth (and, I personally
would recommend this); the fourth edition also which gives
to understand more of principlism’s deep structure than this
new edition. But without doubt: the Principles of Bio-
medical Ethics will stay to be the most important and
influential account in bioethics.
Michael Quante
Cologne, Germany
Sandel, M.: 2007, The Case against Perfection. Ethics in
the Age of Genetic Engineering. Cambridge, Mass: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 162 pages.
ISBN: 978-0674019270. Price: $18.95.
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The aim of Sandel’s book is to make a case against the
engineering and the improvement of human nature. But
what—if anything—is wrong with enhancement? He rec-
ognizes that it is a complicated task to articulate his unease
(or our unease—he prefers the plural form in his book).
The usual philosophical arguments like for example safety,
fairness, two class society, autonomy of the enhanced
human beings etc. are not deep enough: It is always pos-
sible to imagine scenarios in which these arguments do not
apply. Enhancement technologies might be safe, access
could be guaranteed, or enhancement could not impair the
autonomy of the subject etc. Instead ‘‘we need to confront
questions largely lost from view in the modern world—
questions about the moral status of nature, and about the
proper stance of human beings toward the given world.’’
(p. 9)
According to this idea the author articulates two inter-
linked kinds of arguments—the later and deeper one
supporting the first. In a strictly communitarian vein the first
kind of arguments refers to the fate of different human goods
embodied in social practices in case that enhancement
becomes a regular social practice. For example, what we
appreciate and admire in sports (or other activities like
playing music or singing) is the excellence of the performer.
If his performance can be traced back to forms of
enhancement (either because of drug use, technological
advances or gene-enhancement etc.—Sandel recognizes that
the form of enhancement does not play the main morally
relevant role) we lose the object of appreciation: If every
player is enhanced the essence of the game gets lost. Or
consider parenting, an issue that Sandel deals with exten-
sively: The human good embodied in parenting is
unconditional love. If parents can determine the skills and
characteristics of their children this good would be in dan-
ger—the love would be conditional on certain achievements
or features. But there are strong criticisms of these argu-
ments: They are arguments only if one accepts the absolute
priority of the particular goods to be defended, but this does
not need to be the case.
It is Sandel’s second argument that may support his first
one. According to this argument, which is the central one
of book, what is wrong with enhancement is the drive to
mastery. That is the well-known issue of the Promethean
aspiration, in this case, to remake human nature. Instead we
should recognize the giftedness of life—and ‘‘feel its moral
weight’’ (p. 95), that is: To accept the given and corre-
spondingly to refuse enhancement technologies. But the
pressing question is: Why should we do that? Sandel
admits that this kind of argument verges on theology. But
he believes we can accept them without a religious sensi-
bility as well. We have only to recognize that our talents
are endowments exceeding our control whether we have to
thank nature, fortune or god for them (p. 93). But the
problem with this point is evident: Even if this recognition
is clearly possible without believing in a particular god or
having spiritual inclinations of any sort, the acceptance of
its supposed moral weight does not work without an entity
to thank for. If we think that our talents are the result of the
fortune or of the lottery of nature we do not have any
reason to be thankful for that. Instead we have every reason
to feel fortunate—but feeling fortunate does not implicate
that we have to recognize the moral weight of the given in
the sense of a refusal of any form of enhancement. The so
called ‘‘ethics of giftedness’’ can make a case against
enhancement only under the supposition that, like in the
Promethean case, there is a god of sacred entity we are
accountable to. But this cannot be considered as a valid
argument within pluralist societies. Even if Sandel’s book
deals seriously with the debate, it can hardly make the case
against enhancement the author strives for.
Daniel Loewe
Tu¨bingen, Germany
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